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Abstract 
In the last seven years the AFL-CIO has put forth an immense effort to facilitate, support, and encourage 
organizing initiatives by all affiliates. Although to date progress has been much slower than the leadership 
of the labor movement had hoped, more recently there have been some signs that those efforts are 
beginning to bear fruit. A growing number of unions are putting more resources into organizing, recruiting 
and training more organizers, running more organizing campaigns, winning more elections and voluntary 
recognitions, and winning them in larger units. 
Yet, despite all the new initiatives and resources being devoted to organizing and all the talk of "changing 
to organize," American unions today are at best standing still. Massive employment losses in 
manufacturing, retail, hospitality, and airline industries have eliminated hundreds of thousands of union 
jobs, raising the bar even higher for the number of new workers needed to maintain current union density, 
much less grow. At the same time, the political climate for organizing has become ever more hostile as 
the threat of terrorism and the fog of war have been used to justify a full scale attack on civil liberties, 
federal sector unions, immigrant workers, and organizing and collective bargaining rights. 
Even in this climate, some unions, in some industries, have still managed to make major organizing gains, 
despite intensive employer opposition. In just the last several years we have witnessed significant 
victories such as CWA at Cingular Wireless, IFPTE at Boeing, UAW at New York University, PACE at Imerys, 
SEIU at Catholic Healthcare West, UNITE at Brylane, and HERE in the Las Vegas hotels. Although there 
was great variation in the industry, workforce, union, and company characteristics in each of these 
campaigns, still a pattern becomes evident—the unions that are most successful at organizing run 
fundamentally different campaigns, in both quality and intensity, than those that are less successful. 
In this paper we focus on these fundamental differences in the nature of winning and losing campaigns 
which provide us with a blueprint for the kinds of comprehensive organizing strategies that are required to 
win across a wide range of organizing environments and company and unit characteristics. We also look 
at the strategic, organizational, and cultural changes the U.S. labor movement must make in order to be 
able to mount these more comprehensive campaigns and make the gains necessary to significantly 
increase union density and the political and economic power that goes with it. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the last seven years the AFL-CIO has put 
forth an immense effort to facilitate, support, 
and encourage organizing initiatives by all 
affiliates. Although to date progress has been 
much slower than the leadership of the labor 
movement had hoped, more recently there 
have been some signs that those efforts are 
beginning to bear fruit. A growing number of 
unions are putting more resources into 
organizing, recruiting and training more 
organizers, running more organizing 
campaigns, winning more elections and 
voluntary recognitions, and winning them in 
larger units. 
Yet, despite all the new initiatives and 
resources being devoted to organizing and all 
the talk of "changing to organize," American 
unions today are at best standing still. 
Massive employment losses in 
manufacturing, retail, hospitality, and airline 
industries have eliminated hundreds of 
thousands of union jobs, raising the bar even 
higher for the number of new workers 
needed to maintain current union density, 
much less grow. At the same time, the 
political climate for organizing has become 
ever more hostile as the threat of terrorism 
and the fog of war have been used to justify a 
full scale attack on civil liberties, federal sector 
unions, immigrant workers, and organizing 
and collective bargaining rights. 
Even in this climate, some unions, in some 
industries, have still managed to make major 
organizing gains, despite intensive employer 
opposition. In just the last several years we 
have witnessed significant victories such as 
CWA at Cingular Wireless, IFPTE at Boeing, 
UAW at New York University, PACE at Imerys, 
SEIU at Catholic Healthcare West, UNITE at 
Brylane, and HERE in the Las Vegas hotels. 
Although there was great variation in the 
industry, workforce, union, and company 
characteristics in each of these campaigns, 
still a pattern becomes evident—the unions 
that are most successful at organizing run 
fundamentally different campaigns, in both 
quality and intensity, than those that are 
less successful. 
In this paper we focus on these fundamental 
differences in the nature of winning and 
losing campaigns which 
provide us with a 
blueprint for the kinds 
of comprehensive 
organizing strategies 
that are required to win 
across a wide range of 
organizing 
environments and 
company and unit 
characteristics. We 
also look at the 
strategic, organizational, 
and cultural changes the U.S. labor 
movement must make in order to be able to 
mount these more comprehensive 
campaigns and make the gains necessary to 
significantly increase union density and the 
political and economic power 
that goes with it. 
The unions that are 
most successful at 
organizing run 
fundamentally different 
campaigns, in both 
quality and intensity, 
than those that are less 
successful. 
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RESEARCH METHOD 
The primary source of data for this research is 
a study commissioned in May 2000 by the 
United States Trade Deficit Review 
Commission to update Bronfenbrenner's 
previous research on the impact of capital 
mobility on union organizing and first contract 
campaigns in the U.S. private sector.1 Using 
surveys, personal interviews, documentary 
evidence, and electronic databases, we 
compiled detailed data on election 
background, organizing environment, 
bargaining unit demographics, company 
characteristics and tactics, labor board 
charges and determinations, union 
characteristics and tactics, and election and 
first contract outcomes for a random sample 
of 412 NLRB certification election campaigns 
held in 1998 and 1999. Descriptive statistics 
were calculated for a wide range of variables 
in order to capture the nature and extent of 
union and employer organizing activity and the 
broader context in which they operate. In 
addition, we used binary logistic regression to 
determine whether the number of 
comprehensive union-building strategies has a 
statistically significant impact on certification 
election outcome when controlling for the 
influence of election background, company 
characteristics, bargaining unit demographics, 
and employer opposition. 
The findings from the survey data are 
supplemented by national data on 
employment, union membership, union 
density, workforce demographics, and trade 
and investment for the period from 1997-
2002, compiled from published and on-line 
reports from the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS), the Department of Commerce, and the 
Bureau of National Affairs (BNA). In addition 
we utilized data from a customized NLRB 
database on NLRB certifications from 1997-
2002 compiled by BNA Plus.2 
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CHANGING CLIMATE 
Although the late 1990s has been generally 
hailed as a period of robust economic 
expansion and extensive job growth, this 
expansion was much less universal than has 
been claimed. Instead, by the end of the 
decade employment trends followed the 
well-established pattern in the U.S. economy 
of declining employment in manufacturing 
and expanding employment in the service 
sector, public sector, and most other sectors 
such as communications, construction, retail 
and wholesale trade, and transportation. 
As described in Figure 1, the loss of 814,000 
union members in manufacturing accounted 
for 40 percent of the more than 1.9 million 
jobs lost in manufacturing between 1997 and 
2002. At the same time employment growth 
among unorganized workers in the service 
sector (4.8 million) and government sector 
(1.1 million) entirely outstripped the 364,000 
new members gained in the service sector 
and the 604,000 new members gained in the 
government sector during the same period. 
Between 1997 and 2003, in all sectors 
combined, total employment increased by 
8.108 million at the same time union 
membership declined by 6,000, leaving a net 
gain in the unorganized workforce of 8.114 
million. As a result of these trends, unions 
faced a continuation of 
the steady decline in 
union density levels 
that began a half a 
century ago, falling to 
13.2 percent by 2002. 
The private sector 
accounted for all of the 
loss in union density as 
unions in the public 
sector held a fairly 
consistent density rate 
of 37.5 percent over 
the last decade. In 
contrast, private sector 
union density fell below 10 percent in 1997, 
reaching just 8.5 percent by 2002. Under 
these circumstances the U.S. labor 
The U.S. labor 
movement has to 
organize hundreds of 
thousands of workers 
just to stand still, and 
millions of new workers 
to make any significant 
gains in private sector 
union density. 
6,000 
Figure 1: Changes in employment and union membership by industrial sector, 1997-2002 
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movement has to organize hundreds of 
thousands of workers just to stand still, and 
millions of new workers to make any 
significant gains in private sector union 
density. But for unions in some sectors the 
bar is much higher. Industrial unions need 
to organize more than 700,000 new 
members just to maintain their current 
density in manufacturing, much less grow, 
while unions in retail and wholesale trade 
need to organize more than 140,000 new 
members just to maintain current density. 
The employment and union membership 
losses have been compounded by changes in 
the policies governing international trade and 
investment. The enactment of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 
1994, the establishment of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) in 1995, and the passage 
of permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) 
with China in 2000 have resulted in rapidly 
increasing trade deficits for the U.S. and have 
facilitated the shift of production to low cost 
regions of the world. With the increase of 
international trade and the spread of 
production networks throughout the world, 
corporate ownership structures have become 
far more complex and global. U.S. workers 
are increasingly tied into the uncertain world 
of foreign direct investment. For unions 
organizing in this environment, particularly in 
mobile industries, the challenges have never 
been greater. 
National NLRB activity 1997 - 2002 
During this same period of increasing 
challenges in the economic, trade, and 
investment environment for organizing, U.S. 
unions have invested enormous staff and 
financial resources into private sector 
organizing in an aggressive attempt to reverse 
the tide of density decline. Unfortunately, 
despite these efforts, private sector organizing 
gains, particularly through the NLRB process, 
remain extremely modest, still insufficient to 
reverse the tide. 
Despite new organizing initiatives, the number 
of elections held has hovered around 3,000 per 
year for more than a decade. After increasing 
in the mid-1990s, in 1998 the number of 
elections held began to decrease to as low as 
2,361 in 2001, increasing slightly to 2,540 in 
2002 (Figure 2). At the same time the number 
of elections won has fluctuated up and down 
each year, dropping to its lowest point, 1,265 in 
2001 and moving back up to 1,414 in 2002. 
3,500^ 
3,000 
2,500 
2,000 
1,500 
1,000 
500 
0 
• Number of elections 
• Number of elections won 
H^ 
1997 
3,268 
1,657 
1998 
3,297 
1,702 
1999 
3,108 
1,304 
2000 
2,826 
1,511 
2001 
2,361 
1,265 
2002 
2,540 
1,414 
Figure 2: Total number of NLRB elections by year, 1997-2002 
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As described in Figure 3, NLRB election win 
rates increased from 51 percent in 1997 to 
56 percent in 2002. While encouraging, it 
would be premature to see this as an 
indicator of organizing success and 
membership growth. For, while win rates 
have increased, the number of eligible voters 
participating in NLRB elections has dropped 
from a high of 243,700 in 1999 to 180,820 in 
2002, a 26 percent drop. Even more 
significant, the percent of eligible voters in 
units where the union won the election 
declined from 46 percent of eligible voters in 
1998 to 40 percent in 2002. 
The combination of fewer elections involving 
fewer eligible voters has led to a significant 
decline in the number of workers joining 
unions through NLRB certification elections. 
By 2002, only 72,718 of the 180,820 
workers who voted in NLRB elections were 
500,000 
450,000 
400,000 
350,000 
300,000 
250,000 
200,000 
150,000 
100,000 
50,000 
0 
. . . . .
 0 . Communications, 0 . .. Retail and _ Manufacturing Services ...... .. .. Construction . , . . . Transportation 
utilities, sanitation wholesale trade 
475,085 475,834 59,020 45,977 99,837 128,688 
138,394 264,430 20,201 21,097 34,033 56,207 
29% 56% 34% 46% 34% 44% 
41% 62% 49% 54% 50% 53% 
70% 
60% 
50% 
4 40% 
30% 
20% 
10% 
0% 
I Eligible voters 
I Eligible voters in units won 
1
 Percent voters in units won 
1
 Percent win rate 
Figure 4: Eligible voters, win rates, and percent of eligible voters won, by industrial sector, 1997-2002 
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in units where the union won the election. 
There is also a great deal of variation in 
NLRB election activity and success across 
different industries and sectors (Figure 4). 
While organizing activity continues to be 
concentrated in both services and 
manufacturing, unions have been much more 
successful in service sector units, achieving 
an average win rate of 62 percent compared 
to a win rate of only 41 percent in 
manufacturing. Thus, although the same 
number of workers has participated in NLRB 
elections in the manufacturing and service 
sectors in the last six years, just over 475,000 
eligible voters in each sector, the total number 
of new workers organized is only 138,394 (29 
percent of eligible voters) in manufacturing 
compared to 264,430 (56 percent of eligible 
voters) in the service sector. 
As described in Table 1, in the last six years 
there was also considerable variation across 
unions both in terms of the number of 
elections and the number of eligible voters in 
elections won. For example, the IBT 
participated in 4,922 NLRB elections involving 
259,540 eligible voters from 1997-2002. Yet 
due to a combination of relatively low win 
rates and small units, the Teamsters were 
able to gain representation for only 79,327 
workers, less than a third of the eligible voters 
Table 1: NLRB summary elections statistics by union, 1997-2002 
Union 
AFSCME 
ATU 
BCTGM 
CWA/IUE 
GCIU 
HERE 
1AM 
IATSE 
IBEW 
IBT 
ILWU 
IUOE 
LIUNA 
OPEIU 
PACE 
PAT 
PPF 
SEIU 
SMW 
UAW 
UBC 
UFCW 
UNITE 
USWA 
Independents 
Number of 
elections 
456 
114 
157 
426 
168 
233 
620 
128 
842 
4,922 
112 
906 
467 
104 
284 
181 
238 
1,362 
257 
510 
421 
1,168 
147 
753 
1,140 
Percent 
win rate 
68% 
61% 
44% 
50% 
37% 
48% 
63% 
59% 
52% 
44% 
67% 
57% 
48% 
6 1 % 
44% 
44% 
44% 
68% 
35% 
55% 
39% 
51% 
61% 
43% 
67% 
Number of 
eligible voters 
in all elections 
39,105 
9,252 
10,281 
33,703 
14,959 
15,206 
49,430 
5,716 
41,596 
259,540 
6,016 
31,391 
28,881 
11,527 
25,629 
3,631 
5,952 
142,937 
10,800 
81,148 
26,525 
104,088 
25,011 
96,279 
101,868 
Number of 
eligible voters 
in units won 
25,054 
5,213 
2,134 
10,838 
3,500 
6,281 
14,810 
3,228 
17,051 
79,327 
3,615 
11,672 
9,229 
5,710 
7,820 
1,664 
1,672 
87,937 
3,498 
38,126 
6,692 
36,447 
18,069 
24,984 
59,696 
Percent of total 
eligible voters in 
elections won 
64% 
56% 
21% 
32% 
23% 
4 1 % 
30% 
56% 
4 1 % 
31% 
60% 
37% 
32% 
50% 
31% 
46% 
28% 
62% 
32% 
47% 
25% 
35% 
72% 
26% 
59% 
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who participated in IBT elections. A similar 
pattern is found for the USWA, 1AM, UFCW, 
IUOE, and LIUNA, where despite a relatively 
large number of elections, low win rates in 
large units resulted in the percent of eligible 
voters in winning units 15 to 30 percentage 
points lower than the average win rate. In 
contrast, SEIU participated in 1,202 elections 
involving 124,539 workers, and, with an 
average win rate of 68 percent, was able to 
gain representation for 76,603 eligible voters 
during this period. Thanks to a combination 
of large average unit size and win rates of 
more than 60 percent, union such as SEIU, 
AFSCME, and UNITE were able to gain 
representation for more than 60 percent of 
the eligible voters in their elections. 
Survey findings on election background: 
Corporate structure 
The findings from our survey data suggest 
that unions organizing today are operating in 
a much more global, mobile, and rapidly 
changing corporate environment (Figure 5). 
While a majority of private-sector organizing 
campaigns continue to be concentrated in 
relatively small units in U.S.-owned for-profit 
companies, these companies are 
increasingly subsidiaries of larger parent 
companies (84 percent), including many 
multinationals (62 percent). This trend occurs 
not because unions are targeting large 
multinational companies, but because the 
U.S. private sector 
economy is increasingly 
dominated by 
multinational firms. 
Only one-third of all 
campaigns occur in for-
profit companies with 
all sites and operations 
based in the U.S., while 
23 percent take place in non-profit 
companies such as hospitals, social service 
agencies, or educational institutions. 
Forty-seven percent of all NLRB elections 
are concentrated in mobile industries where 
production can easily be shifted out of the 
state or out of the country. Not surprisingly, 
win rates average just 34 percent in 
campaigns conducted in mobile industries 
compared to a 54 percent win rate in 
Unions organizing today 
are operating in a much 
more global, mobile, 
and rapidly changing 
corporate environment, 
90% -i 
80% 
70% 
60% 
50% 
40% 
30% 
20% 
10% 
0% J 
EMEI Win rate when present 
^^m Win rate when not present 
am
^
m
 Percent of elections 
Mobile 
industry 
34% 
54% 
47% 
Subsidiary 
41% 
63% 
84% 
Non-profit 
58% 
40% 
23% 
Publicly-held 
for profit 
33% 
52% 
52% 
Privately-held 
for profit 
48% 
43% 
48% 
U.S.-based, 
all sites U.S. 
45% 
44% 
33% 
U.S.-based 
multinational 
39% 
47% 
31% 
Foreign-based 
multinational 
29% 
46% 
12% 
Figure 5: Corporate structure and election outcome 
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immobile industries. Organizing win rates 
average as high as 58 percent in non-profit 
companies, compared to a 40 percent win 
rate in for-profit companies. Among for-
profit companies, win rates are highest for 
U.S.-based companies with all sites in the 
U.S. (45 percent), and lower for foreign-
based multinationals (29 percent) and U.S.-
based multinationals (39 percent). Win rates 
are also much higher (63 percent) in the 16 
percent of the companies that are not a 
subsidiary of a larger parent company, 
compared to a 41 percent win rate for 
companies that are subsidiaries. 
Company characteristics 
As would be expected, given that all of these 
elections occurred during the period of high 
corporate profitability in the late 1990s, 65 
percent of the companies in our sample were 
in good to excellent financial condition at the 
time the petition was filed (Figure 6). Overall, 
win rates are lower in companies in good to 
excellent financial condition (43 percent) than 
in units in fair to poor financial condition (47 
percent), reflecting the fact that more 
profitable companies have greater resources 
to improve conditions for workers and to 
devote to an aggressive anti-union campaign. 
Fifteen percent of the elections take place in 
firms with other organized units at the same 
location as the unit being organized. A much 
larger percentage of companies (60 percent) 
have other organized units at other sites and 
locations of the company, either in the U.S. 
or abroad. Twelve percent of the campaigns 
are located in one of the fourteen 
communities where the Central Labor 
Council (CLC) has met the criteria to be 
designated a Union City by the AFL-CIO.3 
For nearly half of the campaigns in our 
sample (46 percent), there was a previous, 
unsuccessful, attempt to organize the unit. 
Union win rates are much higher in those 
campaigns with other units organized at the 
same site (65 percent) both because of the 
greater access and information available to 
the union and because the unorganized 
workers have a ready-made example of what 
a union can accomplish in their workplace. 
Win rates are only slightly higher at 
companies that had other organized units at 
other sites. Not surprisingly, given the higher 
level of successful organizing activity and 
70% -, 
60% 
50% 
40% 
30% 
20% 
10% 
0% 
FMwn Win rate when present 
• • • Win rate when not present 
mm
^
m
 Percent of elections 
fin 
tc 
Company 
ances good 
excellent 
43% 
47% 
65% 
Company 
finances fair to 
poor 
47% 
43% 
35% 
0 
Previous 
attempt to 
ganize unit 
43% 
46% 
46% 
Other 
organized units 
at other sites 
47% 
41% 
60% 
Other 
organized units 
at same site 
65% 
41% 
15% 
Unit is located 
in Union City 
59% 
42% 
12% 
Ownership 
change before 
election 
55% 
42% 
18% 
Plant closing 
threat before 
election 
35% 
47% 
21% 
Employee 
involvement 
before election 
40% 
47% 
31% 
Figure 6: Company characteristics and election outcome 
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Figure 7: Bargaining unit characteristics and election outcome 
labor-movement support for organizing activity 
in Union Cities, win rates go up to 59 percent 
in campaigns in Union Cities compared to a 
42 percent win rate in other communities. 
Win rates are slightly lower in units with 
previous organizing attempts (43 percent) 
than in units where there was no previous 
attempt to organize the unit (46 percent). 
Figure 6 also presents findings on company 
practices before the organizing campaign 
took place. Nearly a third of the units already 
had an employee involvement or team 
system in place before the election, while 21 
percent had had threats of full or partial plant 
closure, and 18 percent reported changes in 
company ownership. Both pre-campaign 
employee involvement programs and pre-
campaign plant closing threats are associated 
with win rates 7 to 12 percentage points 
lower than in units where they are not 
present. In contrast, changes in company 
ownership are associated with win rates 13 
percentage points higher than in units where 
there had been no change in ownership prior 
to the campaign. This may be because a 
change in company ownership is more likely 
to be associated with practices such as job 
combinations, wage and benefit reductions, 
and increases in the pace of work which, in 
combination, may motivate workers to initiate 
a union campaign and vote for a union. 
Bargaining unit characteristics 
The characteristics of the bargaining units 
where NLRB elections are taking place have 
also changed in recent years. Although 43 
percent of all NLRB elections continue to be 
in production and maintenance units, 17 
percent of all elections today occur in 
professional, technical, and white-collar units 
and 19 percent occur in service and 
maintenance and non-professional units 
(Figure 7). 
Win rates are highest in service and 
maintenance and nonprofessional units (68 
percent), compared to 33 percent in 
production and maintenance units and 44 
percent in professional, technical, and white 
collar units. Win rates are lower (33 percent) 
in the 8 percent of elections where the 
NLRB determined the unit after the petition 
was filed. This reflects the fact that 
employer unit challenges leading to a board-
determined unit are typically associated with 
more aggressive anti-union campaigns. 
BRONFENBRENNER AND HICKEY 9 
Win rates are also higher (53 percent) in the 
22 percent of the units where the average 
wage was less than $8.00 per hour, while win 
rates are lowest (39 percent) in units with an 
average wage of 
more than $12.00 an 
hour. These higher-
wage units tend to 
include more white, 
male, blue collar, 
white collar, and 
professional and 
technical employees, 
all groups less 
predisposed to 
unions than their 
non-white, female 
counterparts in non-
professional, largely 
service, occupations. 
These are also 
workers more 
vulnerable to 
Not only are women 
and workers of color 
participating in union 
elections in ever 
increasing numbers; 
but, because win rates 
are so much higher in 
these units, the vast 
majority of new 
workers coming into 
the labor movement 
today are women and 
people of color, 
employer threats of 
job loss and blacklisting because they tend to 
be more tied to company-specific benefits, 
training, and promotional opportunities. 
Our findings on bargaining unit demographics 
also confirm that organizing is increasingly 
concentrated in units with a majority of 
women and people of color (Figure 8). Only 
35 percent of the units have a majority of 
white men, while women make up the 
majority in 44 percent of the units and 
workers of color make up the majority in 39 
percent of the units. Win rates increase 
substantially as the proportion of women and 
workers of color increases. While they 
average only 35 percent in units with a 
majority of white men, win rates are 53 
percent in units with a majority of workers of 
color, 56 percent in units with at least 75 
percent workers of color, 58 percent in units 
with a majority of women, and 62 percent in 
units with at least 75 percent women. The 
highest win rates are 82 percent for units 
with 75 percent or more women workers of 
color. The higher win rates in these units 
mean that not only are women and workers 
of color, in particular women of color, 
participating in union elections in ever 
increasing numbers; but, because win rates 
are so much higher in these units, the vast 
majority of new workers coming into the 
labor movement today are women and 
people of color. 
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Figure 8: Bargaining unit demographics and win rates 
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Recent immigrants and undocumented 
workers have been involved in many of the 
largest organizing victories in the last five 
years in industries such as home care, hotel, 
laundry, building services, drywall, and 
asbestos removal. However, most of those 
campaigns have been outside of the NLRB 
process. In contrast, only 8 percent of all 
the elections in our sample were in units 
with 25 percent or more recent immigrants 
and only 7 percent of the campaigns had 
undocumented workers in the unit. The win 
rate averages as high as 58 percent in units 
with at least 25 percent recent immigrants, 
but drops down to 36 percent in units with 
undocumented workers. This reflects the 
ability and willingness of employers to use 
the threat of deportation to thwart organizing 
efforts among undocumented workers and 
also suggests one of the reasons why card 
check neutrality campaigns are so important 
in organizing industries with large numbers 
of undocumented workers. 
Employer behavior 
Consistent with earlier research, we find that 
the overwhelming majority of employers 
aggressively oppose union organizing efforts 
through a combination of threats, 
discharges, promises of improvements, 
unscheduled unilateral changes in wages 
and benefits, bribes, and surveillance. Figure 
9 presents data on the most commonly used 
employer anti-union tactics, listed in order 
from those tactics used most frequently by 
employers in NLRB certification elections to 
those tactics which are used least frequently 
by employers. As Figure 9 shows, the use 
of traditional employer anti-union tactics has 
become quite pervasive, and, both 
individually and in combination, these tactics 
are extremely effective in reducing union 
election win rates. 
Fifty-two percent of all employers and 68 
percent of those in mobile industries made 
threats of full or partial plant closure during 
the organizing drive. Approximately one in 
every four employers (26 percent) 
discharged workers for union activity, while 
48 percent made promises of improvement, 
20 percent gave unscheduled wage 
increases, and 17 percent made unilateral 
changes in benefits and working conditions. 
Sixty-seven percent of the employers held 
supervisor one-on-ones with employees at 
least weekly, 34 percent gave bribes or 
special favors to those who opposed the 
union, 31 percent assisted the anti-union 
committee, and 10 percent used electronic 
surveillance of union activists during the 
organizing campaign. Employers threatened 
to refer undocumented workers to the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) 
in 7 percent of all campaigns and in 52 
percent of cases where undocumented 
workers were present. 
Consistent with previous research, we find 
that for the most aggressive individual 
employer anti-union tactics, win rates 
average ten to twenty percentage points 
lower in campaigns where the tactic is used 
compared to campaigns where the employer 
does not use the tactic. For just two tactics, 
promoted pro-union activists and used the 
media, the win rate is actually higher in units 
where those tactics are used compared to 
the win rate where they are not used. One 
possible explanation is that employers only 
bother to promote union activists out of the 
unit or run a media campaign when there is 
a strong chance the union will win. 
As described in Figure 10, the majority of 
employers use a combination of tactics. 
Forty-eight percent of the employers ran 
moderately aggressive anti-union campaigns 
using five to nine tactics, 26 percent of the 
employers ran extremely aggressive 
campaigns using ten or more tactics, but only 
23 percent ran a weak campaign using one to 
four anti-union tactics. Employers ran no 
campaign whatsoever against the union in 
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Figure 9: Employer tactics and election outcome 
only 3 percent of the cases in our sample, 93 
percent of which the union won. Overall, the 
win rate drops to 55 
percent for units 
where employers 
used one to four anti-
union tactics, 39 
percent where they 
used five to nine 
tactics, and 34 
percent where they 
used ten or more. 
The fact that there is 
only a slight drop in 
win rates between 
moderately 
aggressive and 
extremely aggressive 
employer campaigns 
suggests that in 
some units 
aggressive anti-union behavior by employers 
may reach a point of diminishing returns, 
particularly at a time when unions are running 
The overwhelming 
majority of employers 
aggressively oppose 
union organizing 
efforts through a 
combination of threats, 
discharges, promises 
of improvements, 
unscheduled unilateral 
changes in wages 
and benefits, bribes, 
and surveillance. 
more aggressive and sophisticated 
campaigns and workers' trust in corporations 
is declining. 
Union organizing tactics 
We have shown just how challenging the 
organizing environment has become for 
unions organizing in the private sector. Yet 
that does not tell the entire story about the 
current state of union organizing today. 
National organizing data also show that some 
unions have been able to win even against 
some of the nation's most formidable anti-
union employers, even in the most mobile 
and most global industries. This raises the 
critical question about what role union 
strategies play in determining whether or not 
unions succeed in organizing large numbers 
of new workers in their primary industries. 
When we first conducted research to 
examine these questions in the late 1980s, 
we found that unions were more likely to win 
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NLRB elections if they used rank-and-file-
intensive tactics such as person-to-person 
contact, active representative committees, 
member volunteer organizers, solidarity days, 
and building for the first contract before the 
election.4 This research also found that union 
tactics as a group had a more significant 
impact on election outcomes than other 
groups of variables such as election 
environment, bargaining unit demographics, 
organizer background, and employer tactics. 
We found this to be true not because 
employer behavior and organizing 
environment did not matter. As our research 
on public sector organizing has shown, 
absent employer opposition workers across a 
diversity of occupations, regions, and 
industries readily and eagerly choose unions 
when they can do so free of the coercion, 
harassment, and intimidation that is so 
prevalent in the traditional NLRB process. 
Instead, we found that union tactics mattered 
more because they are the one area where 
there was great variation from union to union, 
industry to industry, and campaign to 
campaign. And, even in the public sector, 
where we found employer opposition to be 
much less aggressive, and in a quarter of 
elections not present at all, the use of rank-
and-file intensive union tactics during the 
organizing campaigns is not only associated 
with higher election win rates, but with 
higher first contract rates and post-first 
contract membership rates as well. 
However, as we have 
outlined in earlier 
sections of this paper, 
a great deal has 
changed in the 
economy, corporate 
ownership structure 
and practices, and the 
labor movement itself 
since we first started 
tracking private and 
public sector 
organizing campaigns 
in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s. Workers in almost every industry 
face more sophisticated employer opposition 
to organizing coupled with dramatic increases 
in corporate restructuring, foreign trade and 
investment, and shifts in work and production 
to other companies and other countries. 
The use of traditional 
employer anti-union 
tactics has become quite 
pervasive, and, both 
individually and in 
combination, these tactics 
are extremely effective in 
reducing union election 
win rates. 
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Figure 10: Election activity and outcome by intensity of employer campaign 
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This process did not happen all at once. 
By the early 1990s traditional organizing 
approaches and the isolated use of innovative 
tactics gradually decreased in effectiveness 
as the organizing 
climate became 
more complex and 
employer opposition 
more sophisticated. 
Yet, when these 
variables were 
combined into a 
comprehensive 
union-building tactic 
variable, adding one 
unit for each 
additional union-
building tactic used, 
the probability of the 
union winning the 
election increased 
by as much as 9 percent for each additional 
tactic, suggesting that individual union tactics 
had become less important in determining 
By the early 1990s 
traditional organizing 
approaches and the 
isolated use of 
innovative tactics 
gradually decreased in 
effectiveness as the 
organizing climate 
became more complex 
and employer opposition 
more sophisticated, 
election outcome than a comprehensive 
union building campaign that incorporated 
person-to-person contact, leadership 
development, escalating internal and external 
pressure tactics, and building for the 
first contract. 
Table 2 examines changes over the last 
decade in the use and effectiveness of some 
of the tactics that our research found to be 
key elements of a comprehensive union 
building strategy. Although many unions are 
running more effective and aggressive 
organizing campaigns than they were a 
decade ago, the majority of unions continue 
to run relatively weak campaigns. While the 
use of many of the individual tactics has 
increased by 10 to 20 percentage points, the 
use of some tactics, such as representative 
committees, ten or more small group 
meetings, or more than 70 percent surveyed 
one-on-one, actually declined by 1998-1999. 
Moreover, most of the key union-building 
tactics are being used in less than a third of 
Table 2: Union tactics and election outcome, 1986-1987,1993-1995, and 1998-1999 
1986-1987 1993-1995 1998-1999 
Percent of 
elections 
Percent 
win rate 
Percent of Percent Percent of Percent 
elections win rate elections win rate 
Representative committee 
More than 50% housecalled 
More than 10 small 
group meetings 
More than 70% surveyed 
one-on-one 
Solidarity days used 
Bargaining committee 
set up before election 
Rallies held 
Job actions organized 
in the workplace 
Mass media used 
Community campaign 
Involved other unions 
Union used five or more tactics 
Union used ten or more tactics 
23% 
28% 
22% 
62% 
61% 
39% 
41% 
38% 
43% 
47% 
34% 
36% 
37% 
41% 
32% 
52% 
41% 
52% 
53% 
12% 
15% 
3% 
2% 
11% 
8% 
6% 
3% 
0% 
46% 
53% 
64% 
50% 
10% 
52% 
64% 
53% 
100% 
0% 
44% 
17% 
16% 
33% 
15% 
14% 
13% 
28% 
30% 
6% 
45% 
60% 
53% 
46% 
51% 
56% 
43% 
39% 
50% 
72% 
18% 
45% 
19% 
30% 
16% 
18% 
24% 
33% 
50% 
3% 
57% 
52% 
55% 
46% 
65% 
51% 
52% 
43% 
51% 
64% 
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all campaigns. The win rates associated 
with most of the individual tactics have 
either declined or remained relatively stable 
since 1986-1987. 
Even unions that do use more innovative and 
rank-and-file intensive tactics tend to use 
them piecemeal rather than as part of a 
sophisticated, comprehensive, and consistent 
strategy. When we look at all tactics 
combined, starting in 1986-1987, only 3 
percent of all unions used five or more tactics 
and none used ten or more tactics. By 1993-
1995, 30 percent were using five or more 
tactics and 6 percent were using at least ten 
tactics. In 1998-1999 the percent using at 
least five tactics had increased to 50 percent 
but the percent of campaigns using at least 
ten tactics dropped to 3 percent, even though 
win rates averaged as high as 64 percent in 
campaigns where ten or more union tactics 
were used. 
What is most striking about these results is 
the inconsistency in the use of the tactics 
both within campaigns and over time. 
Although organizer training programs and 
materials have been emphasizing the 
importance of these tactics for more than a 
decade, these data suggest that, even today, 
only a small number of unions are using 
these tactics in a consistent way, and even 
those that do, tend to use them in isolation, 
not as part of a comprehensive multi-faceted 
campaign. Most significantly, in light of 
labor's much touted effort at "changing to 
organize," there has been only a minimal 
increase in the use of these tactics, both 
individually and in combination, since 1995, 
far from what is required to increase union 
density and bargaining power. 
Organizer background 
A central component to labor's renewed 
commitment to organizing has been an effort 
to recruit and train a cadre of new organizers 
to staff and lead 
campaigns. Part of 
this effort has 
included an 
emphasis on 
developing a 
younger and more 
diverse pool of 
organizers who are a 
better match to the 
workers most 
actively organizing 
today. For many 
unions, this has not been an easy process, 
since their organizing departments tend to be 
woefully understaffed, and the staff they do 
have is neither young nor diverse. 
Some unions have 
been able to win even 
against some of the 
nation's most 
formidable anti-union 
employers, even in the 
most mobile and most 
global industries. 
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Table 3: Characteristics of organizing staff in NLRB certification election campaigns 
Percent or mean Percent win rate Percent win rate 
of elections when present when not present 
Staff resources 
Organizer ratio at least 
1 to 100 workers 
Women organizers 
Lead organizer female 
One or more female 
organizers lead or staff 
Percent female organizers 
Female organizers for units 
at least 25% female 
People of Color 
Lead organizer 
79% 
56% 
4 4 % 
55% 
46% 
2 1 % 
44% 
24% 
53% 
49% 
— 
42% 
41% 
— 
44% 
person of color 
One or more organizers 
of color, lead or staff 
Percent organizers 
of color 
Percent African-American organizers 
Percent Hispanic organizers 
Percent Asian/Pacific Islander organizers 
Percent Native American organizers 
Percent organizers of other races 
Organizer of color for units at least 
25% workers of color 
Lead organizer woman of color 
Percent women organizers of color 
Spoke language of non-English 
speaking workers 
22% 
45% 
28% 
13% 
11% 
2% 
1% 
1 % 
65% 
7% 
11% 
7 1 % 
58% 
50% 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
52% 
69% 
— 
47% 
41% 
40% 
— 
— 
__ 
— 
— 
47% 
43% 
— 
50% 
Table 3 provides some insight into the 
progress unions have made in both recruiting 
enough organizers to staff campaigns and 
developing a pool of organizers who better 
reflect the changing U.S. workforce. If we 
compare these findings with our earlier 
research, we find there has been some 
improvement in staff levels in NLRB 
campaigns. Today, 79 percent of the 
campaigns have the recommended standard 
of at least one organizer for every hundred 
workers, compared to 53 percent in 1995. 
Unions have not just been 
increasing the number of 
organizers assigned to 
campaigns; they have also been 
recruiting a more diverse 
organizing staff. 
Unions have not just been increasing the 
number of organizers assigned to campaigns; 
they have also been recruiting a more diverse 
organizing staff. In the late 1980s only 12 
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percent of lead organizers were women and 
15 percent were people of color. By 1995 
the proportion of lead organizers who were 
women had increased to 16 percent while 
the proportion of lead organizers who were 
people of color had dropped to 9 percent. 
Today, 21 percent of lead organizers are 
women, 22 percent are workers of color, and 
7 percent are women of color. 
Consistent with previous research we find 
that win rates are higher for lead organizers 
who are women and/or workers of color 
than they are for their white male 
counterparts. However, rather than 
suggesting that women and people of color 
make inherently better organizers, our earlier 
research has shown that the unions who 
hire more female organizers and organizers 
of color, such as UAW, SEIU, UNITE, CWA, 
AFSCME, and HERE, tend to run more 
aggressive and effective campaigns. 
The increased diversity among organizing 
staff goes well beyond lead organizers. 
Forty- five percent of NLRB election 
campaigns have at least one woman as a 
lead or staff organizer and 35 percent have 
at least one person of color as lead or staff 
organizer. For all elections, 24 percent of all 
organizers are women, 11 percent are 
women of color, and 28 percent are people 
of color. In total, 13 percent of organizers 
are African-American, 11 percent are 
Hispanic, 2 percent are Asian/Pacific Islander, 
1 percent are Native American, and 1 
percent are other races. In units with at least 
with 25 percent or more women in the unit, 
56 percent have at least one woman 
organizer on staff and in units with 25 percent 
or more people of color, 65 percent have at 
least one person of color on the organizing 
staff. Seventy-one percent of campaigns had 
at least one organizer who spoke the 
language of workers in the unit for whom 
English was not their primary language. 
Although these data suggest that unions are 
doing a better 
job of recruiting 
organizers who 
are a better 
match for the 
work force 
being organized, 
it still shows 
that in nearly 
half the units 
where at least 
25 percent of 
the workers 
were women 
and a third of 
the units where at least 25 percent were 
workers of color, organizer demographics 
failed to reflect the demographics of the unit. 
Thus, despite progress, there continues be a 
fairly significant, albeit shrinking, gap 
between the demographic make up of the 
workforce targeted for organizing and the 
demographics of the organizers who staff 
these campaigns. 
There continues be a fairly 
significant, albeit shrinking, 
gap between the 
demographic make up of 
the workforce targeted for 
organizing and the 
demographics of the 
organizers who staff 
these campaigns. 
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COMPREHENSIVE UNION STRATEGIES 
What the data on organizing tactics and 
organizer background reveal is that in the 
current organizing environment it is not 
enough to simply utilize as many union 
tactics or recruit as many organizers as 
possible. Instead, for unions to make any 
significant organizing gains in the private 
sector they will have to mount organizing 
campaigns that are more aggressive, 
comprehensive, creative, and strategic and 
they will need to recruit and train enough 
organizers to effectively mount these more 
comprehensive campaigns. Based on our 
analysis of the evolution of successful union 
organizing over time, a new model of 
comprehensive union strategies emerges 
that is based on two fundamental principles. 
The first is that union success in certification 
elections depends on a comprehensive 
union-building strategy that incorporates the 
following ten elements, each of which is a 
cluster of key union tactics that are critical to 
union organizing success (see Table 4 on 
page 20 for definitions of the key elements): 
1. Adequate and appropriate staff and financial resources 
2. Strategic targeting and research 
3. Active and representative rank-and-file organizing committees 
4. Active participation of member volunteer organizers 
5. Person-to-person contact inside and outside the workplace 
6. Benchmarks and assessments to monitor union support and set thresholds 
for moving ahead with the campaign 
7. Issues which resonate in the workplace and in the community 
8. Creative, escalating internal pressure tactics involving members in the 
workplace 
9. Creative, escalating external pressure tactics involving members outside 
the workplace, locally, nationally, and/or internationally 
10. Building for the first contract during the organizing campaign. 
" ' " ) ^ ^ * S ^ ^ » $ S ^ ^ 
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These strategic elements, which we call 
comprehensive organizing tactics, are each 
associated with higher win rates and/or have 
statistically significant positive effects on 
election outcome. However, given the hostile 
climate in which unions must operate, the use 
of these individual comprehensive organizing 
tactics is not enough. Instead, union gains 
depend on a multi-faceted campaign utilizing 
as many of the ten comprehensive organizing 
tactics as possible and the likelihood of the 
union winning the election significantly 
increases for each additional comprehensive 
organizing tactic utilized by the union. 
The second principle underlying the 
comprehensive organizing model is that 
differences in the quality and intensity of the 
campaigns between unions are a better 
While the majority of unions 
today run very weak campaigns 
with no underlying strategy, the 
majority of employers run very 
strategic campaigns, taking full 
advantage of the range of 
effective anti-union tactics 
available to them. 
predictor of differences in election outcomes 
for those unions than employer opposition, 
bargaining unit demographics, or company or 
industry characteristics. We do not suggest 
that industry, corporate structure, unit type, 
worker demographics, or employer 
opposition do not matter. All of these 
factors have a very powerful and significant 
impact on union win rates. Indeed, it is more 
difficult to organize mobile industries, such 
as metal production and fabrication, garment 
and textile, food processing, and call centers, 
in the current global trade and investment 
climate. It is also more difficult to organize 
subsidiaries of large multinational 
Union gains depend 
on a multi-faceted 
campaign utilizing 
as many of the ten 
comprehensive 
organizing tactics 
as possible, 
corporations that have the resources to 
launch full-scale counterattacks against union 
campaigns. Furthermore, higher paid, 
primarily white male, blue collar, white collar, 
and professional and 
technical occupations are 
more difficult to organize 
in the current climate 
because they tend to be 
more affected by the 
threats of job loss or 
blacklisting that are typical 
in employer campaigns 
today. Although industry, 
unit type, worker 
demographics, and 
employer characteristics and tactics matter, 
union tactics matter more, because unions 
have so far to go before they live up to their 
full potential. While the majority of unions 
today run very weak campaigns with no 
underlying strategy, the majority of 
employers run very strategic campaigns, 
taking full advantage of the range of 
effective anti-union tactics available to them, 
and adapting and tailoring those tactics 
depending on the organizing environment 
and the union's campaign. 
If all unions were running aggressive 
comprehensive campaigns and win rates 
continued to vary across the organizing 
environments in which individual unions 
operate, then these differences in organizing 
environment would play the primary role in 
explaining the variance in organizing success 
between unions. Instead, the more 
successful unions owe their organizing 
victories to the nature, quality, intensity, and 
comprehensiveness of their campaigns, 
across a diversity of industries, companies, 
bargaining units, and employer campaigns. 
Similarly, unions with lower win rates lose 
more elections because of the lack of 
intensity, quality, and comprehensiveness of 
the campaigns they run rather than the 
organizing environment in which they operate. 
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Table 4: Definition of elements of the comprehensive organizing model 
Comprehensive 
Union-Building Tactics Definition 
1. Adequate and appropriate 
staff and financial resources 
2. Strategic targeting and 
research 
3. Active and representative 
rank-and-file organizing 
committee 
4. Active participation of 
member volunteer 
organizers 
5. Person-to-person contact 
inside and outside the 
workplace 
6. Benchmarks and 
assessments to monitor 
union support and set 
thresholds for moving 
ahead with the campaign. 
Unions have at least one organizer for every 100 eligible voters in the unit; one 
woman organizer for units with 25 percent or more women; and one organizer of 
color for units with 25 percent or more workers of color. 
The union researched the company before the start of the campaign or the 
company was part of a union targeting plan and the union represented other 
workers at the same employer or in the same industry 
At least 10 percent of the unit is represented on the committee; there is at least 
one woman on the committee if the unit is 10 percent or more women; at least one 
person of color on the committee if the unit is 10 percent or more workers of color; 
and committee members met with workers one-on-one in the workplace and 
engaged in two or more of the following actions during the campaign: spoke at 
house meetings, spoke out at captive audience meetings, spoke at community 
forums, conducted assessments, assisted with preparing board charges, or helped 
organize job actions. 
The union used at least five member volunteers from other organized units and they 
engaged in one or more of the following: meetings outside the workplace, one-on-one in the 
workplace, teafleting outside the workplace, speaking at community forums, or assessments. 
The union housecalled the majority of the unit or surveyed workers one-on-one 
about what they wanted in the contract and conducted at least ten small group 
meetings or house meetings. 
The union used written assessments to evaluate membership support for the union 
and waited to file the petition until at least 60 percent of the unit signed cards or 
petitions. 
7. Issues which resonate in the 
workplace and community 
The union focused on two or more of the following issues during the campaign: 
dignity, fairness, quality of service, power, voice, or collective representation 
8. Creative, escalating internal 
pressure tactics involving 
members in the workplace 
The union used two or more of the following workplace tactics: five or more 
solidarity days, job actions, rallies, march on the boss for recognition, petitions 
rather than cards, and union supporters joined employee involvement committees. 
9. Creative, escalating 
external pressure tactics 
involving members outside 
the workplace, locally, 
nationally, and/or 
internationally 
10. Building for the first 
contract before the 
election 
The union involved one or more community groups during the campaign and also 
did at least one more of the following: corporate campaign, cross-border solidarity, 
involving other unions, using either paid or free media. 
The union did one or more of the following before the election: chose the bargaining 
committee, involved workers in developing bargaining proposals, or surveyed at 
least 70 percent of the unit one-on-one about what they wanted in the contract. 
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Elements of the comprehensive 
organizing model 
Each of the ten elements of the 
comprehensive organizing model enhances 
the union's organizing power in a unique way. 
Unions that allocate adequate staff and 
financial resources, for example, make an 
institutional commitment to be more 
intensely engaged in the campaign, recruit an 
organizing staff that is demographically 
representative of the workers they organize, 
and run more campaigns. Unions that 
engage in strategic targeting tend to 
approach organizing as a means to build 
bargaining power within certain sectors and 
industries, in contrast to the non-strategic 
"hot-shop" organizing model. 
Perhaps the single most important 
component of a comprehensive campaign is 
an active, representative committee that 
gives bargaining unit members ownership of 
the campaign, allows the workers to start 
acting like a union inside the workplace, 
builds trust and confidence among the 
workforce and counteracts the most negative 
aspects of the employer campaign. 
The use of member volunteers to assist in 
organizing campaigns reflects a combination of 
greater institutional integration of current and 
potential new members, and an emphasis on 
a worker-to-worker approach to organizing. 
Person-to-person contacts made inside and 
outside the workplace enhance the union's 
organizing power by providing the intensive 
one-on-one contacts necessary to build and 
sustain worker commitment to unionization 
both at home and in the increasingly hostile 
election environment at work. 
The combination of benchmarks and 
assessments allows unions to evaluate worker 
support for the union at different stages of the 
campaign in order to better adjust their 
strategy to the unit they are trying to organize 
and to set thresholds to determine when, and 
whether, they are ready to move on to the 
next stage of the campaign. A focus on 
three building blocks of 
issues that resonate with the workers and 
the community, such as respect, dignity, 
fairness, service quality, and union power 
and voice, is essential both to build worker 
commitment to 
withstand the At the core are the 
employer 
campaign and to 
gain community any organizing campaign 
support upon which all the other 
internal pressure comprehensive tactics 
tactics allow the , , , . , 
un,on to start depend: adequate and 
acting like a union appropriate staff and 
before the financial resources, active 
election takes
 t ' 
place, building representative committee, 
solidarity and
 and benchmarks 
commitment 
among the and assessments, 
workers being 
organized and restraining employer 
opposition. External pressure tactics that 
exert leverage on the employer both in the 
local community and in their national and/or 
international operations are essential to 
organizing in the increasingly global 
corporate environment. Finally, building for 
the first contract before the election helps 
build confidence in the workers being 
organized, showing them what the union is 
all about and signaling to the employer that 
the union is there for the long haul. 
While each of the ten elements of the model 
are important in themselves, their ultimate 
effectiveness depends upon them being 
integrated as part of a larger comprehensive 
campaign using as many of the ten elements 
of the model as possible, with each tactic 
enabling and amplifying the effectiveness of 
the others. At the core are the three building 
blocks of any organizing campaign upon 
which all the other comprehensive tactics 
depend: adequate and appropriate staff and 
financial resources, active representative 
committee, and benchmarks and 
assessments. Absent adequate and 
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appropriate resources, unions will be unable 
to staff and finance the labor-intensive, 
grassroots tactics that a comprehensive 
organizing campaign requires, from 
conducting in-depth research on company 
ownership, to recruiting and training staff, 
member volunteers, and organizing 
committee members, to engaging in 
escalating pressure tactics in the workplace 
and the community. Similarly, a 
representative and active committee is 
necessary to develop rank-and-file leadership, 
build the union inside the workplace, and 
make connections between workers and the 
community outside the workplace. And, 
without benchmarks and assessments, the 
union is flying blind, unable to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the campaign tactics they 
have chosen and when, whether, and how 
best to move forward with the campaign. 
Table 5 presents summary statistics for the 
ten comprehensive organizing tactics clusters 
that make up our strategic organizing 
campaign model. Overall, only 14 percent of 
all the union campaigns devote adequate and 
appropriate resources to the campaign, only 
19 percent engage in person-to-person 
contact inside and outside the workplace, and 
only 17 percent engage in escalating pressure 
tactics outside the workplace. Fewer than 30 
percent have active representative 
committees or effectively utilize member 
volunteer organizers, while fewer than 25 
percent used benchmarks and assessments, 
or focused on issues that resonate in the 
workplace and broader community. The 
highest percentages are found for strategic 
targeting (39 percent), escalating pressure 
tactics inside the workplace (37 percent), and 
building for the first contract before the 
election is held (35 percent). 
All of the comprehensive organizing tactics 
are more likely to be used in winning 
campaigns than in losing ones. The results 
are particularly striking for the three core 
comprehensive tactics - adequate and 
Table 5: Union use of comprehensive organizing strategies 
Percent of Percent of Percent of 
elections elections won elections lost 
Adequate and appropriate staff 
and financial resources 
Strategic targeting 
Active representative 
rank-and-file committee 
Effectively utilized member 
volunteer organizers 
Person-to-person contact inside 
and outside the workplace 
Benchmarks and assessments 
Issues which resonate in the 
workplace and community 
Escalating pressure tactics 
in the workplace 
Escalating pressure tactics 
outside the workplace 
Building for the first contract 
before the election 
14% 
39% 
26% 
27% 
19% 
24% 
23% 
37% 
17% 
35% 
21% 
45% 
33% 
3 1 % 
23% 
35% 
25% 
42% 
18% 
39% 
9% 
34% 
21% 
23% 
16% 
14% 
21% 
33% 
16% 
3 1 % 
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Adequate and 
appropriate 
resources 
64% 
41% 
Strategic 
targeting 
51% 
40% 
Active 
representative 
committee 
56% 
41% 
Member 
volunteer 
organizers 
52% 
42% 
One-on-one 
contact 
53% 
42% 
Benchmarks 
and 
assessments 
66% 
38% 
Issues which 
resonate 
49% 
43% 
Escalating 
internal tactics 
50% 
41% 
Escalating 
external 
tactics 
48% 
44% 
Building for 
first contract 
50% 
42% 
Figure 11: Percent win rate in campaigns using or not using comprehensive union tactics 
appropriate resources (used in 21 percent of 
winning campaigns but only 9 percent of 
losing campaigns), active representative 
committees (33 percent of winning 
campaigns compared to only 21 percent of 
losing campaigns), and benchmarks and 
assessments (35 percent of winning 
campaigns compared to only 14 percent of 
losing campaigns). 
As described in Figure 11, each of the 
individual elements in the model are 
associated with win rates that average 
between 4 to 28 percentage points higher 
than in campaigns where they are not 
utilized. Once again the most dramatic 
differences in win rates are associated with 
adequate and appropriate resources (64 
percent when present, 41 percent when not 
present), active representative committee 
(56 percent when present, 41 percent when 
not present), and benchmarks and 
assessments (66 percent when present, 38 
percent when not present). 
The smallest differences are associated with 
issues that resonate in the workplace and 
community (49 percent when present, 43 
percent when not present) and external 
pressure tactics (48 percent when present, 
44 percent when not present). This is to be 
expected given that escalating external 
pressure tactics tend to be only used in 
campaigns with aggressive employer 
opposition, while the effectiveness of issues 
is highly dependent on the tactics unions 
use to get their message across. 
In our survey of organizing campaigns we 
found that win rates increase dramatically for 
each additional tactic used, starting at 32 
percent for no 
comprehensive 
organizing 
tactics, and 
then increasing 
to 44 percent 
for one to five 
tactics, 68 
percent for 
more than five 
tactics, and 100 
percent for the 
1 percent of the 
campaigns 
where unions 
used eight 
tactics.5 At the 
same time, the 
percentage of 
campaigns 
where the 
tactics were used steadily declines as the 
number of tactics increases (Figure 12). 
Fourteen percent of all campaigns use no 
comprehensive organizing tactics, 54 percent 
use fewer than three tactics, while only 10 
percent of all campaigns use more than five 
tactics and none use more than eight. 
Win rates increase 
dramatically for each 
additional tactic used, 
starting at 32 percent for 
no comprehensive 
organizing tactics, and then 
increasing to 44 percent for 
one to five tactics, 68 
percent for more than five 
tactics, and 100 percent for 
the 1 percent of the 
campaigns where unions 
used eight tactics. 
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Figure 12: Percent of elections and election win rate by number of comprehensive tactics used 
Across all industrial sectors, percent win 
rates are much higher in elections where 
unions use a comprehensive organizing 
strategy incorporating more than five 
comprehensive tactics, compared to 
campaigns where they use five or fewer 
tactics (Figure 13). In manufacturing, the win 
rate averages only 20 percent in campaigns 
where unions use no comprehensive 
organizing tactics, increasing only slightly to 
We find that a comprehensive 
organizing strategy improves 
election outcomes substantially, 
across all sectors of the economy, 
even in the most mobile and 
global industries. 
29 percent when they use between one and 
five tactics, but then jump to 63 percent in 
the campaigns where they use more than five 
tactics. In the service sector, the unions win 
44 percent of campaigns where no tactics are 
used, 57 percent in campaigns where one to 
five tactics are used, and 68 percent in 
campaigns where more than five 
comprehensive tactics are used. In all other 
sectors combined, (communications, 
construction, transportation, retail and 
wholesale trade, and utilities) the win rate 
associated with campaigns where no 
comprehensive tactics are used is 29 percent, 
increasing to 45 percent where one to five 
tactics are used, and 75 percent where more 
than five comprehensive tactics are used. 
Thus, we find that a comprehensive 
organizing strategy improves election 
outcomes substantially, across all sectors of 
the economy, even in the most mobile and 
global industries. 
While these data are limited to NLRB 
campaigns, our interviews with organizers 
and union leaders who have been 
successfully organizing through card-check 
neutrality agreements paint a similar picture. 
The unions that have brought in the most 
new members through organizing outside the 
traditional NLRB process (SEIU in building 
services, CWA in wireless, HERE in hotels, 
and UNITE in laundries) have only succeeded 
in these endeavors because they have been 
following a more comprehensive organizing 
strategy, in particular adequate and 
appropriate staff and financial resources, 
strategic targeting, member volunteer 
organizers, a focus on issues that resonate 
with the workplace and the broader 
community, internal and external pressure 
tactics, and building for the first contract 
during the organizing drive. Those that have 
been least successful in winning non-Board 
campaigns have focused on external leverage 
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Figure 13: Comprehensive organizing tactics and election outcome by sector 
The unions that have brought in 
the most new members through 
organizing outside the traditional 
NLRB process have only 
succeeded in these endeavors 
because they have been 
following a more comprehensive 
organizing strategy, 
at the expense of building an active 
representative committee, person-to-person 
contact in the workplace and community, and 
escalating internal pressure tactics. Often 
they have also failed to do the strategic 
research or commit sufficient resources to 
mount the kind of campaign necessary to 
make the cost of fighting the union greater 
than the cost of voluntarily recognizing the 
union and bargaining a first agreement. 
Comprehensive organizing tactics 
and corporate structure 
As difficult as organizing in the private sector 
has become, we find that unions are much 
more likely to overcome the negative impact 
of capital mobility and corporate restructuring 
if they run a comprehensive campaign 
incorporating more than five of the 
comprehensive organizing tactics in our 
Mobile 
industry 
Immobile 
industry 
Subsidiary Publicly-held Privately-held 
for profit for profit 
U.S.-based, 
all sites U.S. 
U.S.-based 
multinational 
Foreign-
based 
multinational 
i Win rate with five or fewer tactics i Win rate with more than five tactics 
Figure 14: Comprehensive organizing tactics, corporate structure, and election win rates 
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model. As described in Figure 14, while the 
win rate is only 33 percent in campaigns in 
mobile industries when the union uses five 
or fewer comprehensive campaign tactics, it 
increases to 56 percent in mobile industries 
when the union runs comprehensive 
campaigns using more than five tactics. 
Even in immobile industries such as health 
care, hospitality, and retail, where there is 
typically a much less hostile environment for 
organizing, win rates increase from 51 
percent to 71 percent when the union runs a 
comprehensive campaign. 
Similarly, the win rates increase twenty to 
thirty percentage points where the union ran 
comprehensive campaigns in subsidiaries of 
larger parent companies, for-profit 
companies, U.S.-based companies with all 
sites and operations in the U.S., and U.S.-
based multinationals. The exception is in 
foreign-based multinationals where we find 
just a minimal increase in win rates (from 29 
percent to 33 percent) for campaigns where 
the union uses more than five 
comprehensive organizing tactics. 
On closer inspection these findings are not 
surprising. Not only are foreign-based 
multinationals much more likely to run 
aggressive anti-union campaigns, but also 
the very fact that the company is foreign 
owned, with sites and operations in other 
countries, serves as an unspoken threat to 
workers that their employer might readily 
shift operations out of the U.S. if they were 
to try to organize. Neither are foreign-based 
companies as vulnerable to the community-
based pressure tactics that have been found 
to be effective for U.S.-based companies. 
Instead, they may require a far more global 
and extensive campaign that takes the 
union's cause to the country and community 
where the company is headquartered. Yet 
not one of the campaigns in foreign-based 
multinationals in our sample ran a global 
campaign and only 10 percent ran any kind 
of external pressure campaign. 
Comprehensive organizing tactics and 
company characteristics 
Comprehensive campaigns are also found to 
be effective across a wide range of other 
company characteristics including financial 
condition, unionization history and 
environment, and pre-campaign conditions. 
As we discussed earlier, win rates are lower 
in companies in good to excellent condition 
than in other units, reflecting the fact that 
those employers have greater resources to 
Good to Fair to poor Other Unit in AFL- Previous Plant closing Employee Ownership 
excellent financial organized CIO Union organizing threat before involvement change 
financial condition units City attempt election before before 
condition election election 
• Win rate with five or fewer tactics • Win rate with more than five tactics 
Figure 15: Comprehensive organizing tactics, company characteristics, and election outcome 
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improve conditions for workers and to 
devote to an aggressive anti-union campaign. 
However, this effect disappears entirely in 
units where the union uses more than five 
comprehensive organizing tactics, bringing 
the win rate up from 36 percent to 70 
percent. Win rates also improve as much as 
20 percentage points when the union uses 
comprehensive campaigns in companies in 
fair to poor financial condition (Figure 15). 
Win rates are also much higher in campaigns 
with other organized units when unions use 
more than five comprehensive tactics (63 
percent versus 45 percent), suggesting that 
unions are better able to capitalize on the 
greater access to workers, company 
information, and union representation record 
that already organized units provide when 
they run a comprehensive campaign. Not 
surprisingly, given the higher level of 
successful organizing activity and labor-
movement support for organizing activity in 
Union Cities, win rates average 59 percent in 
all campaigns in Union Cities and increase to 
as much as 82 percent in campaigns with 
more than five comprehensive union tactics. 
This suggests that Union Cities create a 
climate that serves to support and reinforce 
the effectiveness of the tactics in our 
comprehensive organizing model - by 
offering more union resources available to 
organizing, more training opportunities for 
organizers, and more community and union 
support and leverage to embolden workers 
to vote for the union and discourage the 
employer from running an aggressive anti-
union campaign. 
Figure 15 also presents findings on company 
practices before the organizing campaign 
took place. As we explained earlier, both pre-
campaign employee involvement programs 
and pre-campaign plant closing threats are 
associated with lower win rates. However, 
when unions run aggressive campaigns 
using more than five comprehensive 
organizing tactics, win rates increase to 58 
percent for pre-campaign employee 
involvement programs and 69 percent for 
pre-campaign plant closing threats, 
compared to win rates of 38 percent 
(employee involvement) and 29 percent 
(plant closing threats) in campaigns where 
the union uses five or fewer tactics. 
Comprehensive campaigns also allow unions 
to better capitalize on the worker 
dissatisfaction associated with changes in 
company ownership, with win rates 
increasing from 55 percent to 80 percent 
when unions use more than five 
comprehensive organizing tactics in 
campaigns where there was a change in 
company ownership in the two years before 
the election was held. 
Comprehensive organizing tactics and 
bargaining unit demographics 
A similar trend emerges when we compare 
win rates across bargaining unit 
characteristics for campaigns where unions 
use a more comprehensive organizing 
strategy (Figure 16). As expected, win rates 
average highest for service and maintenance 
units, low wage 
workers, and units Union Cities create a 
with a majority of
 d j m a t e t h a { s e r y e s [Q 
support and reinforce 
the effectiveness of 
the tactics in our 
comprehensive 
organizing model. 
women workers, 
workers of color, 
and in particular 
women workers of 
color regardless of 
the quality and 
intensity of the 
union campaign, 
reflecting the 
greater propensity to support unions among 
these workers. Yet, for all these 
demographic groups the use of a 
comprehensive campaign increases win 
rates from 10 to 28 percentage points to as 
high as 70 percent for service and 
maintenance units, 75 percent of workers 
who average $8.00 or less per hour, 67 
percent for units with a majority of women 
workers, 77 percent for units with a majority 
of workers of color, and 
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Figure 16: Comprehensive organizing tactics, unit characteristics, and election outcome 
81 percent for units with a majority of 
women of color. 
But it is not just campaigns involving these 
demographic groups that benefit from the 
use of a comprehensive campaign strategy. 
For production and maintenance units, 
where the overall win rate averages 33 
percent, the win rate drops to 31 percent in 
campaigns where the union does not run a 
comprehensive campaign, but increases to 
63 percent in campaigns where the union 
uses a comprehensive organizing strategy. 
Similarly, for units with a majority of white 
male workers the win rate averages only 33 
percent when the union uses five or fewer 
comprehensive organizing tactics but 
increases to 80 percent when the union 
uses more than five comprehensive tactics. 
These data suggest that the relatively low 
win rates associated with production and 
maintenance bargaining units, or units with a 
majority of white men, may be a function of 
the quality of the campaigns that unions are 
running in those units rather than anything 
directly relating to the attitudes and 
experiences of the workers themselves. 
Comprehensive campaigns are also effective 
in overcoming the special challenges faced 
by union organizing among recent 
immigrants, including undocumented 
workers, with win rates increasing from 40 
percent in campaigns with five or fewer 
comprehensive organizing tactics to 67 
percent in campaigns with more than five 
comprehensive organizing tactics. 
Comprehensive campaigns are even 
effective among those private sector 
workers where unions have recently 
experienced some of the greatest difficulty 
in organizing, namely professional, technical, 
and white collar workers and higher paid 
workers averaging $12 or more, dollars an 
hour. When unions run comprehensive 
campaigns, win rates increase from 39 
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percent to 46 percent in the 24 percent of 
the campaigns in these units with an 
average wage of $12 or more and from 41 
person to 58 percent in the 17 percent of 
campaigns which involve professional, 
technical, or white collar units. Of course, in 
any given campaign specific concerns and 
issues may apply, and tactics must be 
tailored and adapted accordingly. However, 
our data suggest that, when we look 
generally across the diversity of workers and 
occupations that make up the 
professional/technical workforce, from 
nurses, to engineers, to basketball players, 
win rates increase, rather than decrease, 
when unions run more comprehensive 
campaigns. In fact, unions might greatly 
increase the number of successful 
campaigns involving these demographic 
groups if they were to run more aggressive 
and comprehensive campaigns when 
organizing among these workers. 
The findings also suggest that the negative 
impact on win rates in Board-determined 
units, where the election is delayed by the 
unit determination process and where the 
union ends up with a different unit than 
when the petition was originally filed, also 
can be overcome when unions run more 
comprehensive campaigns. In Board-
determined units where the union did not 
use a comprehensive organizing strategy, 
the average win rate is only 30 percent. 
However, in Board-determined units where 
the union ran a comprehensive campaign 
using more than five tactics, the win rate 
increases to 67 percent. Comprehensive 
campaigns are also equally effective across 
different sized bargaining units increasing 
win rates from 47 percent to 67 percent in 
campaigns with fifty to ninety-nine eligible 
voters and from 43 percent to 68 percent in 
campaigns with one hundred or more eligible 
voters when the union uses more than five 
comprehensive organizing tactics. 
Comprehensive organizing tactics and 
employer behavior 
As we described earlier in the report, the 
overwhelming majority of employers 
aggressively oppose union organizing efforts 
through a combination of legal and illegal anti-
union tactics 
designed to 
dissuade workers 
from voting for the 
union. Yet, as 
described in Figure 
17, union win rates 
associated with all 
of the individual 
aggressive employer 
tactics increase 
between 10 and 40 
percentage points 
when unions use a 
comprehensive 
organizing strategy 
using more than five 
tactics from our 
model, compared to campaigns where they 
used fewer than five tactics. 
The smallest differences in win rates are in 
campaigns where the employer institutes an 
employee involvement program, and where 
the employer threatens to bring the INS into 
units with undocumented workers. This is 
consistent with previous research that the 
use of these employer tactics is particularly 
effective at undermining worker support for 
the union. When employers use these 
tactics it requires that the union use a much 
more comprehensive campaign than those 
run by the unions in our sample, one that 
uses eight, nine, or even all ten elements of 
the model, rather than just five or six. 
In addition to examining win rates associated 
with comprehensive organizing tactics and 
individual employer tactics, it is important to 
assess the impact of more aggressive 
comprehensive union campaigns relative to 
the overall intensity of the employer 
Across the diversity of 
workers and occupations 
that make up the 
professional/technical 
workforce, from nurses, 
to engineers, to 
basketball players, win 
rates increase, rather 
than decrease, when 
unions run more 
comprehensive 
campaigns. 
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Figure 17: Aggressive employer anti-union tactics, comprehensive campaigns, and election outcome 
campaign. Figure 18 compares win rates in 
campaigns with weak employer opposition, 
moderately aggressive employer opposition, 
and aggressive employer opposition in 
elections where the union ran a 
comprehensive campaign using more than 
five comprehensive organizing tactics versus 
elections where the union used five or fewer 
comprehensive organizing tactics (no 
comprehensive campaign). 
The results are striking. In elections with 
moderately aggressive employer campaigns, 
win rates average 93 percent when the union 
runs a comprehensive campaign but drop to 
35 percent when the union fails to run a 
comprehensive campaign. Even in campaigns 
with aggressive employer opposition, win 
rates average 52 percent overall in elections 
where the union runs a comprehensive 
campaign compared to only 29 percent in 
campaigns where the union fails to run a 
comprehensive campaign. 
Overall, unions are running comprehensive 
campaigns in 20 percent of elections with 
aggressive employer opposition, 7 percent of 
elections with moderately aggressive 
employer opposition, and 5 percent of 
elections with weak employer opposition. 
These data confirm that while the majority of 
employers run aggressive campaigns taking 
full strategic advantage of a broad range of 
anti-union tactics, the majority of unions 
continue to run fairly weak campaigns, even 
when faced with aggressive employer 
opposition. Indeed, there were only two 
campaigns in our sample, where, when faced 
with aggressive employer opposition, unions 
used more than six comprehensive organizing 
tactics. Both of those elections were won. 
Thus, consistent with our model, although 
employer anti-union campaigns can and often 
do have a devastating impact on union 
organizing success, unions can increase their 
win rates, even in the face of the most 
aggressive employer opposition, if they run 
comprehensive campaigns. 
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Comprehensive organizing tactics 
and first contracts 
The importance of this model goes well 
beyond the certification election campaign. 
As described below, campaigns where the 
union used more than five comprehensive 
organizing tactics during the NLRB election 
campaign are associated with higher first 
contract rates as well. As described in Figure 
19 first contract rates average 74 percent in 
elections where the union ran a 
comprehensive campaign using more than 
five tactics, compared to a 66 percent first 
contract rate in units where they used one to 
five comprehensive organizing tactics and 
only 58 percent where they failed to use any 
comprehensive organizing tactics. 
These findings are 
also consistent with 
previous research 
on first contract 
rates in the public 
sector, where 
Bronfenbrenner and 
Juravich found that 
even in the context 
of extremely weak 
employer 
Unions can increase 
their win rates, even in 
the face of the most 
aggressive employer 
opposition, if they run 
comprehensive 
campaigns. 
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Figure 19: Comprehensive campaigns and first contract outcome 
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i 
opposition, unions organizing in the public 
sector are more likely to win first contracts 
and to have higher post first contract 
membership rates in open and agency 
shops, when they run more aggressive 
comprehensive organizing campaigns. At 
the same time these findings further expand 
our understanding of the relationship 
between organizing tactics and first contract 
rates in the private sector. Previous research 
had shown that individual union tactics were 
not associated with higher first contract 
rates in the private sector, because they 
were just one 
element in the very 
complex process of 
private sector first 
contract campaigns 
where continued 
aggressive 
employer opposition 
after the election 
and the nature and 
intensity of the 
union first contract 
campaign are the 
primary determinants of first contract 
outcome. In contrast, our findings here 
suggest that the use of a more 
comprehensive strategy during the 
organizing campaign is associated with 
higher first contract rates because it is more 
likely to lay the ground work of strategic 
targeting, leadership development, 
community and labor alliances, and internal 
and external pressure tactics upon which a 
more effective and powerful first contract 
campaign can be built. 
Unions and comprehensive 
organizing tactics 
As we have discussed so far, there is no 
question that some unions, such as the 
UAW in auto-transplants and auto-parts, 
CWA/IUE in high tech and electronics, 
USWA in metal production and fabrication, 
UNITE in garment and textile, or the UFCW 
Campaigns where the 
union used more than 
five comprehensive 
organizing tactics during 
the NLRB election 
campaign are associated 
with higher first contract 
rates as well, 
in food processing, face much greater 
challenges organizing in their primary 
jurisdictions because they are confronted 
with more mobile, more global, and more 
powerful and effective employer opposition 
and, in some cases, a workforce less 
predisposed to unionization. Yet, as we have 
seen, even in the most adverse organizing 
environments, union-organizing success can 
dramatically improve when unions utilize a 
comprehensive campaign strategy. Given 
these differences, what is perhaps most 
striking about our findings is how few unions 
are actually running comprehensive 
campaigns, or even consistently using any of 
the ten elements of our comprehensive 
campaign model. 
Table 6 summarizes the use of 
comprehensive organizing tactics by the 
unions most actively organizing today. In our 
examination of the use of comprehensive 
tactics by all the unions in our sample we find 
that they tend to fall into three main groups. 
The first group, which includes HERE, SEIU, 
and UNITE, averages four or more tactics in 
all of their elections. The second group, 
which includes AFSCME, CWA/IUE, LIUNA, 
UAW, UBC, UFCW, and independent unions, 
averages three tactics per campaign.6 The 
third group, including 1AM, IBEW, IBT, IUOE, 
PACE, and USWA, averages two or fewer 
tactics in each campaign. 
As described in Figure 20, only the unions in 
the first group consistently run organizing 
campaigns that combine at least four 
strategic tactics, representing only 18 percent 
of all elections but 26 percent of elections 
won. These unions use all the elements in 
the model in at least 30 percent of all their 
elections. The overall win rate for this group 
is 63 percent, the highest for any group, 
increasing to 74 percent when they run 
comprehensive campaigns using more than 
five comprehensive tactics. These unions, 
SEIU, HERE, and UNITE, have gained 
national reputations for effective organizing. 
Yet only 30 percent of their campaigns 
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Table 6: Number and percent of comprehensive organizing tactics, by union 
All unions in sample 
At least four 
comprehensive tactics 
Three comprehensive 
tactics 
Two or fewer 
comprehensive tactics 
Unions most actively organizing 
AFSCME 
CWA/IUE 
HERE 
1AM 
IBEW 
IBT 
IUOE 
LIUNA 
PACE 
SEIU 
UAW 
UBC 
UFCW 
UNITE 
USWA 
Local and national 
independents 
3 
"5 
* 1 
3 
z 
2.60 
4.07 
2.93 
1.75 
3.24 
2.73 
4.20 
1.56 
1.33 
1.41 
1.33 
3.10 
2.08 
4.02 
2.92 
2.63 
3.10 
4.22 
2.38 
2.62 
i 
3 O 
& 
14% 
34% 
18% 
4% 
35% 
7% 
90% 
11% 
0% 
4% 
0% 
10% 
8% 
23% 
8% 
0% 
30% 
44% 
3% 
17% 
c I 
.2 
39% 
7 1 % 
44% 
22% 
53% 
60% 
60% 
11% 
11% 
13% 
0% 
50% 
6 1 % 
77% 
44% 
63% 
40% 
44% 
32% 
28% 
.1 
E 
E 
8 
• 
T3 
C 
« 
jit 
c 
CB 
26% 
37% 
27% 
22% 
47% 
13% 
10% 
22% 
11% 
12% 
11% 
20% 
46% 
39% 
32% 
0% 
27% 
56% 
43% 
24% 
1 c 3 
o 
> 
1 
0) 
2 
27% 
30% 
27% 
25% 
29% 
27% 
20% 
11% 
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27% 
0% 
10% 
0% 
32% 
44% 
38% 
13% 
33% 
38% 
28% 
3 
S I 
o 
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19% 
32% 
23% 
11% 
24% 
20% 
50% 
22% 
22% 
5% 
11% 
40% 
15% 
26% 
8% 
25% 
43% 
44% 
16% 
14% 
J2 
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E 
8 
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CD 
24% 
4 1 % 
27% 
14% 
29% 
20% 
40% 
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11% 
20% 
8% 
37% 
24% 
25% 
37% 
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19% 
17% 
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34% 
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0% 
0% 
12% 
11% 
30% 
15% 
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32% 
13% 
17% 
22% 
22% 
4 1 % 
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s 
3 
I 
a 
» 
o a t 
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37% 
46% 
44% 
28% 
4 1 % 
33% 
40% 
33% 
11% 
24% 
56% 
40% 
3 1 % 
49% 
76% 
25% 
33% 
33% 
38% 
38% 
8 1 
£ 
3 
£ 
9 
i_ 
a 
1 
17% 
39% 
17% 
7% 
5% 
40% 
40% 
11% 
11% 
6% 
11% 
20% 
8% 
40% 
16% 
13% 
13% 
33% 
8% 
17% 
2 
o 
o I 
a 
c 
2 
'5 
03 
35% 
42% 
40% 
27% 
24% 
33% 
70% 
22% 
33% 
27% 
22% 
70% 
15% 
37% 
8% 
63% 
57% 
44% 
19% 
38% 
average more than five comprehensive 
organizing tactics, and, with the exception of 
targeting, these unions are using the 
comprehensive tactics that make up our 
model in fewer than half of their campaigns. 
Not only could an increase in the frequency 
(and quality) of the use of all the 
comprehensive tactics substantially increase 
win rates for these unions, but it also might 
facilitate getting more campaigns off the 
ground and winning them in larger units. 
The second group of unions, on average, 
uses fewer tactics and is less likely to 
combine them into a comprehensive 
campaign. Unions in this group average 
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80% -, 
70%-
60%-
50%-
40% 
30%-
20%-
10%-
0%-
n Unions average two or fewer tactics 
• Unions average three tactics 
• Unions average four tactics 
Percent of elections 
46% 
36% 
18% 
Percent of elections 
won 
39% 
35% 
26% 
Percent run 
comprehensive 
campaigns 
3% 
8% 
30% 
Average win rate 
38% 
44% 
63% 
Win rate for 
comprehensive 
campaigns 
67% 
55% 
74% 
Figure 20: Unions, comprehensive tactics, and election outcome 
three comprehensive tactics per campaign, 
and on average, use most of the tactics in 
fewer than 30 percent of their campaigns. 
With an average win rate of 44 percent, this 
group accounts for 36 percent of all 
elections and 35 percent of elections won. 
Not only could an increase in 
the frequency (and quality) of 
the use of all the 
comprehensive tactics 
substantially increase win rates 
for these unions, but it also 
might facilitate getting more 
campaigns off the ground and 
winning them in larger units. 
Only 8 percent of campaigns run by unions 
in this group used more than five 
comprehensive organizing tactics. This 
suggests that while these unions have been 
taking new initiatives and organizing more 
aggressively than in the past, they continue 
to use tactics in isolation, absent the 
interconnected, multi-faceted union-building 
strategy required in the current organizing 
environment. Still, for those few campaigns 
when they do use more than five tactics, the 
win rate is 55 percent. 
The third group of unions, which accounts 
for 46 percent of all elections, uses 
comprehensive campaigns even more rarely. 
Unions in this group average two or fewer 
comprehensive organizing tactics per 
campaign, and, not surprisingly, have the 
lowest average win rate (38 percent) of all 
three groups. Half of the unions in this 
group did not conduct any comprehensive 
campaigns using more than five tactics. 
Again, the win rate is much higher (67 
percent) for the 3 percent of elections in this 
third group in which unions used more than 
five comprehensive organizing tactics. 
The third group of unions averages below 15 
percent for their usage of half the tactics in 
the model (resources, one-on-one contact, 
benchmarks, issues, and external pressure 
tactics) and below 27 percent for their usage 
of all the remaining tactics. This suggests 
that nearly half of the unions involved in 
NLRB certification elections run campaigns 
similar to campaigns in the late 1980s when 
we first started tracking the nature and 
success of union organizing efforts. The 
findings are less surprising given that, on 
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average, unions in this third group had 
adequate and appropriate resources in only 4 
percent of their campaigns. Without such 
resources, it is difficult to pull together many 
of the other elements of the model. 
Each of the individual tactics shows a 
different pattern of usage across the three 
groups, providing important insights into the 
"changing to organize" process. For 
Nearly half of the unions 
involved in NLRB certification 
elections run campaigns similar 
to campaigns in the late 1980s 
when we first started tracking 
the nature and success of 
union organizing efforts. 
example, the frequency of targeting and 
external pressure tactics varies widely among 
the three groups, while the use of member 
volunteers shows much less variation. This 
suggests that while more sophisticated 
tactics, such as targeting and external 
pressure tactics, have yet to be embraced by 
many unions, even the least successful are 
comfortable with more traditional tactics, 
such as having members assist with 
organizing campaigns. Yet, even the most 
successful unions still do not make 
consistent use of such key tactics as 
adequate and appropriate resources, active 
representative committees, person-to-person 
contact, benchmarks and assessments, 
member volunteers, and internal and external 
pressure tactics. 
These data highlight three important trends. 
First, higher win rates are associated with 
campaigns that use five or more 
comprehensive organizing tactics for all three 
groups of unions. Second, the unions with 
the greatest organizing success are those 
that consistently combine comprehensive 
organizing tactics. Third, there is a real mix of 
industries, companies, and unit types among 
the three union groups, yet comprehensive 
organizing tactics are consistently effective 
across the different groups. 
Improving the odds of union 
organizing success 
In combination, the survey data confirm that 
the use of a multi-faceted comprehensive 
campaign plays a much greater role in 
determining election outcome than individual 
union tactics and many other election 
environment variables such as company 
characteristics, bargaining unit 
demographics, and even employer 
opposition. As we found in our recent study 
for the University of 
California Institute
 T h e u n j o n s w j { h { h e 
for Labor and . . 
Employment, the greatest organizing 
more
 success are those that 
comprehensive . . ., . . 
tactics used during consistently combine 
the campaign, the comprehensive 
greater the odds 
that the union will 
win the election, 
even when we control for industry, corporate 
structure, bargaining unit demographics, and 
employer opposition.7 According to our 
findings, although each of the ten 
comprehensive organizing tactics are 
individually associated with higher win rates, 
the only tactics that were found to have a 
statistically significant impact on the odds of 
a union win were adequate and appropriate 
resources, increasing the odds of an election 
win by 119 percent, rank-and-file committee 
(89 percent), and benchmarks and 
assessments (162 percent).8 
These findings confirm that these three 
variables are fundamental elements of a 
comprehensive campaign, building blocks 
that enhance the union's ability to engage in 
any of the other tactics included in the 
organizing tactics, 
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model. Absent adequate and sufficient 
resources, unions will be unable to staff and 
finance the labor-intensive, grassroots tactics 
that a comprehensive union building 
campaign requires. Similarly, a 
representative and active committee is 
necessary to develop rank-and-file leadership, 
build the union inside the workplace, and 
make connections between the workers and 
the community outside the workplace. 
Benchmarks and assessments are essential 
to evaluate when 
Each additional and whether t0 use 
. . each of the other 
comprehensive union tactics and when 
tactic used by the union and whether to 
i L _|i * move on to the next 
increases the odds of a
 phase of the 
union win by 34 campaign 
percent, even when w i * these 
controlling for the !'ndings 7 f o r c e , 
J
 the importance of 
impact of election these three tactics, 
environment, company their individual 
. impact was not as 
and UniOn great as the 
Characteristics, and aggregate effect of 
including the 
additive 
comprehensive 
organizing tactic variable.9 Together, the 
descriptive and regression findings indicate 
that while resources, committees, and 
benchmarks and assessments are 
fundamental elements of a comprehensive 
campaign, they are not sufficient, in that 
they are most effective in combination with 
other comprehensive organizing tactics. 
When individual organizing tactics are 
combined into a single additive 
comprehensive organizing tactic variable, each 
additional comprehensive union tactic used by 
the union increases the odds of a union win 
by 34 percent, even when controlling for the 
impact of election environment, company and 
union characteristics, and employer behavior. 
Thus, the unions in our sample that used at 
employer behavior. 
least six comprehensive organizing tactics 
increased their odds of winning the election 
by 204 percent (six times 34 percent). Using 
the same logic, unions averaging four or more 
tactics increased their odds of winning the 
election by at least 136 percent, while those 
averaging three tactics increased their odds 
by 102 percent, and those averaging two or 
fewer tactics increased their odds no more 
than 68 percent. 
In brief, we found that the use of 
multifaceted, comprehensive union 
campaigns plays a much greater role in 
determining election outcome than individual 
union tactics. Our analysis also confirms that 
the more comprehensive organizing tactics 
used during the campaign, the greater the 
odds that the union will win the election, even 
when we control for industry, corporate 
structure, bargaining unit demographics, and 
employer opposition. Lastly, we found that 
although employer opposition and election 
environment all have a significant impact on 
election outcome, the number of 
comprehensive organizing tactics has as 
much impact as employer opposition and 
more impact than election environment. 
Given the consistency and strength of 
employer campaigns and the great potential 
for improvement in the quality and intensity of 
union campaigns, these results lend further 
support to the argument that the nature and 
intensity of union campaigns, rather than the 
specific industry, company, and or unit type in 
which the campaign takes place, play the 
most critical role in determining differences in 
win rates among unions. 
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BLUEPRINT FOH ORGANIZING SUCCESS 
The coming years will be a period of 
enormous risks and challenges for the 
American labor movement. Almost all 
unions, locally and nationally, understand that 
both their political power and their bargaining 
power will be severely undermined unless 
they organize on a massive scale across 
every sector of the economy. Yet, as we 
have shown, this is also a time of great 
possibility for American unions. While 
unions face enormous difficulties in changing 
in the present political, legal, and economic 
environment for organizing, the one area 
they do control, their own organizing 
strategy, has great potential for helping 
unions recapture power and leverage at the 
bargaining table and in the political arena. 
What follows is a ten-point plan for taking 
advantage of this potential and doing what is 
necessary to reverse the organizing crisis 
and rebuild the American labor movement. 
UNIONS NEED TO COMMIT THE 
APPROPRIATE STAFF AND 
FINANCIAL RESOURCES 
NECESSARY TO TAKE ON NEW KINDS OF 
EMPLOYMENT STRUCTURES AND WIN 
AGAINST LARGE AND DIFFUSE 
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS. 
Organizing campaigns in these firms and 
industries will require more staff, more 
member volunteers, and more supplies, 
equipment, vehicles, and facilities. At a time 
when many unions are faced with a rapidly 
declining dues base, finding and committing 
these resources becomes more and more 
difficult. But it is essential all the same. 
And, it bears remembering, putting out the 
resources to launch a large organizing drive 
still costs the union less than the devastating 
cost of losing units to decertifications, broken 
strikes, contracting out, or plant closings. 
PART OF ORGANIZING 
STRATEGICALLY IS DOING THE 
RESEARCH AND POWER 
ANALYSIS OF THE EMPLOYER BEFORE 
THE CAMPAIGN IS LAUNCHED, SO THAT 
UNIONS CAN BEST EVALUATE WHICH 
TARGETS THEY SHOULD FOCUS ON 
FIRST, which workers in which 
sectors/industries and firms will be most 
receptive to organizing, and where unions 
can best use their 
bargaining leverage 
either directly through 
already organized 
units in the same firm 
or indirectly through 
unionized customers, 
suppliers, and current 
or future investors. 
Moving into industries 
outside their primary 
jurisdictions in search 
of easier election 
wins does nothing to 
stop the erosion of 
density within their 
primary industries or 
strengthen their bargaining power in already 
organized units. Instead, it expends 
resources in an environment where they may 
be able to win elections more easily but have 
neither the density nor experience in the 
industry to effectively bargain for and 
represent the unit after the election is won, 
and distracts them from focusing on the 
critical task of increasing union density within 
their primary industries. 
The nature and 
intensity of union 
campaigns, rather than 
the specific industry, 
company, and or unit 
type in which the 
campaign takes place, 
play the most critical 
role in determining 
differences in win rates 
among unions. 
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3 THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF U.S. UNIONS MUST CHANGE HOW THEY ARE 
RUNNING CAMPAIGNS. IT IS TOO EASY TO 
BLAME THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, LABOR 
LAW, AND EMPLOYER OPPOSITION FOR 
THEIR ORGANIZING FAILURES, when in fact 
many unions continue to run weak and 
ineffectual organizing campaigns and have 
mostly themselves to blame for their 
organizing failures. Unions need to take a 
hard look at the nature and intensity of the 
campaigns they are losing and determine 
what they could do differently to take on the 
same or similar employers and win. Most of 
all, it will mean doing the hard, slow work of 
developing representative rank-and-file 
leadership and giving them an active role in 
the campaign; recruiting, training, and 
effectively using member volunteer organizers 
from already organized units; identifying and 
mobilizing around issues which resonate with 
workers and the broader community; 
engaging in escalating internal and external 
pressure tactics to build commitment among 
the workers and constrain the employer anti-
union campaign; and starting to act like a 
union and begin the process of building for 
the first contract before certification is won. 
UNIONS NEED TO ESTABLISH 
CLEAR BENCHMARKS TO 
DETERMINE WHAT THEY NEED 
TO ACCOMPLISH WHERE THEY NEED TO 
GO BEFORE MOVING FORWARD WITH 
THE CAMPAIGN, AND AN EFFECTIVE 
ASSESSMENT SYSTEM TO HONESTLY 
EVALUATE WORKER SUPPORT AND 
COMMITMENT TO THE UNION CAMPAIGN 
AT EVERY STAGE OF THE PROCESS. This 
requires not moving forward with the 
campaign unless and until a representative 
committee is in place, not filing the petition 
for the election or demanding recognition 
until they have a solid majority of the 
broadest possible unit, and not moving 
forward to an election or to demanding 
recognition, until, through assessing a series 
of escalating tests, such as wearing a union 
button, attending a union rally, speaking out 
in captive audience meetings in the 
workplace and in public meetings with 
community and labor allies, they are certain 
that they have maintained majority support. 
In some cases, this will also require 
withdrawing from organizing campaigns 
before the election is held in order to avoid a 
devastating loss that emboldens the 
employer to brutalize the workers in the unit 
where the election took place, and 
undermines union organizing efforts, not just 
for their union, but other unions in the same 
firm, industry, or community. 
UNIONS MUST BUILD 
ALLIANCES WITH OTHER 
UNIONS, COMMUNITY 
GROUPS, POLITICAL LEADERS, CLERGY, 
AND OTHER NON-GOVERNMENTAL 
ORGANIZATIONS BEFORE THE 
ORGANIZING CAMPAIGN BEGINS. This is 
necessary both to create a more supportive 
environment for the workers who are 
organizing and to shine the light of public 
awareness on the employer campaign. For 
only by building these alliances and coalitions 
can unions engage other stakeholders in the 
company and community in bringing the 
leverage necessary to restrain employers 
from more aggressive opposition and 
encourage them to recognize the union and 
bargain a strong first agreement. And, in an 
increasingly global organizing environment, 
these alliances and campaigns must become 
global as well. 
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MEMBERSHIP EDUCATION AND 
LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT 
ARE CENTRAL TO BUILDING 
CAPACITY FOR ORGANIZING. RATHER 
THAN SHIFTING MONEY AWAY FROM 
EDUCATION INTO ORGANIZING, UNIONS 
SHOULD BE FINDING WAYS TO 
STRENGTHEN THE ROLE THAT 
EDUCATION PLAYS IN THE ORGANIZING 
PROCESS. This includes using labor 
education programs to build membership 
and leadership support for organizing and to 
train member volunteer and staff organizers 
in comprehensive organizing strategies. 
It also includes using union and university 
labor education programs to bring more 
women and people of color into staff and 
leadership positions and to educate the 
community about workers' issues and the 
right to organize. Most important of all, it 
includes developing leaders among the 
workers being organized and teaching them 
how to build a union in their workplace that 
can withstand even the most aggressive 
employer campaign. 
WHILE CHANGING 
DEMOGRAPHICS IN THE 
WORKFORCE MAY POSE A 
DIFFICULT CHALLENGE TO SOME UNIONS, 
THESE NEW WORKERS FROM DIVERSE 
ETHNIC, RACIAL, AND GENDER 
BACKGROUNDS CAN ALSO OFFER AN 
OPPORTUNITY TO JUMP START A MORE 
INSPIRED, COMMITTED, AND EFFECTIVE 
GRASS ROOTS MOVEMENT to organize 
workers in all industries, just as they did in 
earlier union organizing struggles among 
textile workers in Lawrence, Massachusetts, 
in the early 1900s or during the rise of the 
industrial union movement in the 1930s. 
Capitalizing on those opportunities will 
require not only organizing more women, 
people of color, and immigrants into unions, 
but also providing the training and leadership 
development to fully integrate newly 
organized workers into unions, and recruiting 
new organizers from the membership. 
Ideally this means pulling together a mix of 
organizers, some experienced staff and 
leaders, some member volunteers or 
members on release time, and some young 
and passionate organizers who have the 
energy, enthusiasm, mobility, and training 
required to organize in a more hostile and 
complex environment. 
MANY UNIONS HAVE BECOME 
VERY EFFECTIVE IN PUTTING 
?'£&& TOGETHER MULTIFACETED, 
ESCALATING, AND MORE OFTEN THAN 
NOT, GLOBAL CONTRACT CAMPAIGNS TO 
TAKE ON SOME OF THE MOST 
POWERFUL MULTINATIONALS AND 
INVESTORS IN THE WORLD. Yet many 
of these same unions balk at launching 
equally intensive, aggressive, international, 
and comprehensive campaigns when 
attempting to organize workers in equally 
large, globally-connected, and anti-union 
multinational corporations. Transforming 
such comprehensive campaigns into 
offensive international organizing efforts 
could help mitigate the worst effects of 
global trade, international investment, and 
employer opposition. But it cannot be a 
one-sided relationship. If U.S. unions are 
going to seek the support of unions and 
non-governmental organizations around the 
globe, they are also going to have to become 
more engaged in supporting organizing and 
bargaining efforts by unions in other 
countries by contributing resources, using 
their bargaining leverage, and engaging in 
cross-border actions. 
BRONFENBRENNER AND HICKEY 39 
UNION DENSITY OFTEN SERVES 
AS AN INDICATOR OF UNION 
POWER, POTENTIALLY 
INCREASING ORGANIZING SUCCESS AND 
BARGAINING STRENGTH. Yet most U.S. 
unions, particularly in some of our highest 
density industries in the manufacturing, 
transportation, or entertainment sectors, fail 
to capitalize on union density in their primary 
industries when it comes to organizing new 
workers. Developing and implementing 
strategies that tap that potential strength will 
require greater coordination between unions' 
traditional core of activities—collective 
bargaining, political action, and organizing. 
Such coordination must include expanded 
use of bargaining leverage to gain card check 
neutrality in other sites, operations, and 
subsidiaries of the same employer. It also 
must include the integration of union activity, 
and coordinate activity throughout production 
chains to leverage customers and suppliers 
to pressure the employer to back off the 
anti-union campaign, recognize the union, 
and bargain a first agreement. It will also 
require taking on entire firms and industries 
in intensive multi-site campaigns comparable 
to those being run by HERE in hotels, CWA 
in wireless telecommunications, UNITE in 
laundries, and SEIU in health care. 
THE TASK OF ORGANIZING 
IN MANUFACTURING, 
HIGH TECH, AND OTHER 
MORE MOBILE SECTORS OF THE 
ECONOMY MUST BECOME THE 
RESPONSIBILITY OF THE ENTIRE LABOR 
MOVEMENT Unions in the service sector 
and public sector must make assisting 
unions with organizing in these more 
difficult organizing environments as much 
of a priority as organizing in their own 
primary jurisdictions. This assistance 
includes providing resources, contributing 
staff and member volunteers, and assisting 
with community coalitions, organizing 
actions, and pressuring the employer. But 
most of all it means working with all the 
unions in communities where unorganized 
firms in manufacturing, transportation, 
retail, or high tech are located to create the 
kind of "union city" atmosphere that 
effectively counteracts the fear, 
intimidation, threats, and misinformation 
that are so much a part of nearly every 
employer campaign in these industries. 
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CONCLUSION 
None of these changes will come easily. At 
the same time labor has struggled to 
regroup, the economic, political, and legal 
climate has only grown more hostile. And 
for many unions, making these changes will 
require major changes in resource allocation, 
institutional structure, organizational culture, 
and leadership. 
Even the country's most successful unions 
cannot rest on their laurels. Despite notable 
victories, they too have yet to organize on the 
scale necessary for labor's revival or to fully 
utilize the comprehensive strategies that will 
allow them to expand their gains. At a time 
when unions need to be organizing hundreds 
of thousands of workers just to maintain 
union density at current levels, they will need 
to organize millions, across every industry, if 
they are going to make any significant gains 
in union density. 
Unions cannot wait—for labor law reform, for 
a more favorable economic climate, or a 
more favorable political environment—before 
they begin to utilize this more 
comprehensive, multifaceted, and intensive 
strategy in all their organizing efforts, inside 
and outside the NLRB process. Regardless 
of sector or industry, the challenge facing 
unions today is to move beyond a simple 
tactical effort to increase numbers, and to 
engage in the self-reflection and 
organizational change necessary to reverse 
the larger pattern of decline. Only then will 
"changing to organize" really bear fruit, and 
only then will American unions be able regain 
their power at the bargaining table, in the 
voting booth, and in the larger community. 
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